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This article concerns itself with two bus boycotts, one well known,the other less
so. They are interesting in themselves, but here it is suggested that they are
relevant towards an understa of South African black resistance in general,and
in particular in the context of the 1950s when African political organisations were
attempting to mobilise large numbers of people in campaigns which had the ultimate
aim of hastening the collapse of the existing political structure. A problem of
that period , noted by many commentators both hostile and friendly to the
liberation movement,is that despite the Congress Alliance's efforts to articulate
its long-term aims through immediate issues: pass laws, wages, and so forth; despite
the government's lack of concern to effectively legitimise its authority in the eyes
of the masses; despite this being a period of economic stagnation relative to the
preceding decade, so wages rose only very slowly and probably declined in real terms,
nevertheless, mass response to African political organisation was uneven and often
disappointing. Ben Turok, a former activist within the Congress movement, tells us
that by the second half of the 1950s, after ah initial promise at the beginning of the
decade, support for the national movement was falling off in urban areas; that
frustration and repression were beginning to promote political apathy (Turok 1973: 333)
The boycotts will therefore be discussed within the general context of the problems
of political mobilisation.
1.2
Most analyses of the period tend to bring to the surface, not always intentionally,
the tensions between leaders and followers, between political organisation and its
potential constituency, between formal institutionalised resistance and informal
'spontaneous1 protest. There are three principal approaches. The first is the one
adopted by many members of the political organisations concerned. Using the wisdom
of hindsight they tend to interpret the history of the period as involving the
careful and logical unfolding of a continuous grand strategy which has the effect
of raising the level of mass political consciousness to further heights, hastening
the arrival of all the necessary conditions for a succesful revolution. The role
of the party is that of a vanguard: it plans campaigns which in terms of their
proclaimed objectives are doomed to failure, which in their frustration have the
effect of lifting the scales from the eyes of those who hitherto believed that
their sufferings could be ended within the confines of the existing political and
economic framework. Each campaign elicits a cumulatively more savage response
from the authorities which in turn deepens the masses1 hatred of the system and their
willingness to confront it whatever the penalty or cost (see Slovo 1976: 170). The
first approach, therefore involves the vision of a politically inert mass which
initally must be activated by a catalyst - in this case the African National
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Congress and its allies in the Congress movement.
1.3
The second approach, sometimes used by those, who for one reason or another are
critical of the African National Congress, is to contend that in fact the ANC
functioned during the 1950s in precisely the opposite way. That the people, the
masses, did not need to be cajoled and prodded into resistance, they had no illusions
about the iniquity of the system; rather,it is argued leadership actually perpetuated
certain illusions, it curbed popular militancy; guided by its own class interests,
which were those of an aspirant petty bourgeoisie, it sought to restrain the course
of. protest and guide it into channels in which it would serve the interests of
this class as opposed to those of the masses. So that when there was an outburst.of
protest, political organisations would institutionalise it, bureacratise it, blunt
the keennessof popular anger. For such critics the history of the 1950s is the
history of lost opportunities, of chances squandered ( Feit 1967: 29-31; Socialist
League of Africa 1961: 7-9)
A third approach, favoured by the sociologists, Fatima Meer and Leo Kuper, falls rathe
between the other two. For while recognising the existence of spontaneous mass-
muMnerings which can suddenly erupt into violence, they imply that there is something
qualitively different between the nature of protest involved in, say, a beer hall
riot and that of an orchestrated campaign against,for example^Bantu Education. In
spontaneous movements the agencies of oppression are ignored while the wrath of the
crowd breaks on a specific or associated grievance: it is the grievance, not the
system of which it is but a symptom which makes the direct emotional impact and
dominates the perception of the crowd. This contrasts with the behaviou of a
political movement which deliberately concentrates its energies on attacking a
symptom - for example, pass laws - but articulates this attack in a general
strategy directed against the system itself. The behaviour of the mass can be
likened to that of a psychotic: themass cannot see beyond the immediete provocative
trifle to the root of its passion. The trifle restored or the grievance alleviated
will reduce the passion, which though considerably more violent and excitable than the
disciplined application of political energy, is never very sustained.
Nevertheless the incident that provokes a disturbance which is essentially apolitical
( ! in character, though arising from a specific grievance, is embedded in a matrix of
grievances. Ideally the role of the political organisation is an ambivalent one. On
the one hand it trie3 to control and direct the energies of spontaneous protest -
often attempting to divert it away from activity which is percieved to be
unprofitable and asteful - thus in a sense it seeks to curb' the implicit violence
of mass disaffection. On the other hand organisations try to ! sympathetically
interpret1 popular emotion - to locate the immediate grievance in the matrix of ;
grievances, to employ the raw energy of communal protest in a politically
constructive manner, to ensure that the short term victories are gained and seen as
victories, not concessions, as signs of weakness in authority and hence stages
along a road of confrontations involving progressively more vital and important
issues. In this sense, compromises to gain short terra victories, while they are
open to the accusation of reformism and of blurring the focus and disappating the
emotion of spontaneous protest are tactically vital in any long term strategy of
revolutionary implications. As Martin Legassick (n.d. :17) has pointed out:
...the means by which any revolutionary party mobilizes its social
base are reformist, whether one talks about a "mass line","immediete
demands", or a minimum program. The problem is whethernreformist" deman
can win and retain popular support and whether their internal logic
leads to a questioning of the system as a whole, and a stronger power





The bus boycotts provide promising material for the testing of these
assumptions concerning the interplay between the behaviours of phe organisation
and the crowd. In looking at the two movments, the boycotts of Alexandra and
Evaton, the following questions will be implicit in the analysis and there
will be an attempt to resolve them at the end:
1.5.1
What is the role of political organisations in these movements? Are
they performing the vanguard function suggested by Slovo, that is to say
raising the consciousness of a politically backward, not to say passive,
mass? Or do they attempt to bureacratise mass action, divert it along
channels dictated by the class interests of a petty bourgeoise leadership?
Or is the process rather the dialectical one suggested by Kuper and Meer:
crowd behaviour ideally conditioning and being conditioned by in increasingly *
effective ways the role of the political organisation?
1.5.2
Is there a distinct pattern to bus boycott behaviour which can lead us
to suppose that they can form part of a programme of what Legassick calls
'institutionalizing1 popular power - that is, part of a strategy which
involves objectives that are acceptable to authority in the sense that it
can be compelled to accept them - that is, a gradual process of consolidating
popular power at a local level round economic objectives and informal
structures that are not explicitly threatening to state authority but which
nevertheless involving a growth of mass consciousness of power? With this
growth in self awareness, a unified and direct challenge to the political and
economic system to defend or extend certain gains becomes possible?
1.5.3
If this is the case, does it suggest an alternative strategy to those adopted by




Let us now turn to the Alexandra Bus Boycott. I am first going to describe the
underlying causes of the boycott as well as the immediate precipitating actions.
Then I am going to look at the course of the boycott itself laying especial
emphasis on the role certain organisations, groups and individuals played.
Finally I will discuss the implications of the settlement.
2.2
The Alexandra bus boycott was the response of an African community to a penny
rise in the single bus fare between the township and the centre of Johannesburg
nine miles away. Now the failure of the African National Congress to evoke a
consistently massive response during the 1950's is explained by Fatima Meer who
suggests: 'revolution is not a popular cause .... security of a familiar system,
even if limiting, is invariably preferred to the risks of change' (Meer J.971:
150). It has also been asserted that rising black expectations were being
matched by the pace of economic growth; that urban Africans had too much to
lose if administrative tranquility and economic productivity were interrupted
or disturbed (Feit 1967: 130). The bus boycotts help to demonstrate that the
economic climate of the 1950*s did precious little to provide for the needs of
a large proportion of the members of the urban black community. The African
family budget rested on a knife edge: in 1956 the average wage was £ 191 a year (1).
A penny increase in bus fares amounted to another 1.4 per cent of income being
devoted to cost of going to work - regardless of the transport needs of the wage-
earner's family. When one also considers that well over eighty per cent of
Johannesburg's black families had incomes below the level needed for 'minimum
essential expenditure' (Horrell 1956-1957: 166-170) it does not take much
perception to see that efforts to explain failure in political mobilisation
as a result of satisfaction of African economic aspirations are pretty far
fetched.
2.3
The other point to consider is that the rise in bus fares brought up a number of
issues arising out of transport problems. Transport was not a minor issue.
Bus boycotts were a very common form of protest in the 1950's (2) and the
Alexandra boycotters were to attract an enormous amount of support and interest
throughout South Africa. As well as the townships directly affected by the
fare rises there were well supported sympathy boycotts among communities which
had not recently suffered them; these included Moroka, Port Elizabeth and East
London. In part these bore testimony to the African National Congress's
organizational strength (and an indication that it has been underrated by
some scholars) - but they were also, surely, a reflection of the accumulated
frustrations that developed out of the problems of transport in towns. It
wasn't simply the cost of transport that was an issue in bus boycotts. In 1943
the complaints of Alexandra commuters had included such matters as routing,
overcrowding, departures from schedule, danger, unsheltered terminals, and rude
staff (3). Fourteen years later there had not been much improvement. Buses
were still crowded (as they are today), they were badly ventilated and insuf-
ficient in number. African residential areas are. often far away from the workplace
and in addition to the journey time there were also the periods spent waiting in
long bus queues, often without adequate shelter. In 1953 it was estimated
that Alexandrans spent three and a half hours a day commuting (4). There was
little consultation over timetabling and when the buses reached townships they
would often stop at a single terminal: people would sometimes have to walk a
considerable distance to their homes from the bus stop. And on top of all
this they were not exactly cheap either: transport was quite often the second
major item in the family budget. It is not difficult to understand the way
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transport issues seemed to touch on an exposed nerve in the black community.
2.4.
To understand the boycott we must know something of the history and character^
of Alexandra township. The first thing that is significant is that Alexandra
was a freehold area; as in So phi at own, Mart ind ale and Newel are, Africans could
own land (5). There seems to be a correlation between well supported bus
boycotts and freehold property rights; as well as in Alexandra there had been
major boycotts in Western Native Township, Sophiatown, Lady Selbourne and Evaton;
also areas where Africans owned property. Such places were often very densely
populated which contributed to the difficulties of administering them but which
also helped to create a strong feeling of communal solidarity (6)»Alexandra's
population was growing very swiftly in the 1950's: in 1943 it was estimated at
50,000, less than ten years later it was thought to have 80,000 inhabitants (7).
The pace of this growth was in part a response to the recent industrial
development in the neighbouring areas of Wynberg and Bergvlei. Alexandra
was a township which had evolved organically over forty years rather than, as
was the case with the South West Townships, being suddenly and artificially
constructed by external agencies. The political liveliness of the community
must have owed something to the fact that it was extremely difficult to police;
despite pleas from stallholders there was no police station in the township (8)
and in the 195Ofs police entered it only with the greatest reluctance (Turok
1973: 355). Alexandra had a tradition of bus boycotts. The first took place in
1940 and succeeded in forcing bus companies to reduce fares by a penny to 4d. The
operators were to attempt to put the fares up three times in the next five years
and on each occasion a boycott prevented them from doing so. The longest of these
boycotts lasted for six weeks from November 15 1944. As well as the boycotts there
had been an important squatters movement led by Schreiner Baduza in 1946 - 1947;
in Alexandra there was a well developed history of collective action by the
community.
2.5
Alexandra was administered by the Alexandra Health Committee. The township lay
outside the municipal area and consequently the committee had very few sanctions
or resources to make its authority effective. It's six officers could do little
to control building (one of the designated functions of the committee) and
therefore Alexandra was very crowded. Standholders were often heavily in debt: in
the 1940s eighty-five percent of the property was bonded. (9) Moneylenders charged
high interest and standholders would build up to about fifteen lean-to rooms on
their stands (10), letting each room to a family for rents that could be as high as
£4 a month (11). There was the most apalling poverty: an ANC representative claimed
that most wage earners earned on average £2 10s a week (12) (SAIRR figure*for an
average Johannesburg black family income was £15 18 lid a month) (13). Alexandra's
poverty in comparison to other black townships was reflected in the infant mortality
figures: 23 per cent of the children born there died within a year, mainly of
malnutrition (the figure for Johannesburg was 4 per cent) (14). There was an
unusually high degree of youth unemployment: influx control regulations prevented
people who were born in Alexandra from seeking work in Johannesburg (Huddlestone 1956
26-28). This, combined with the absence of policing in Alexandra which caused it
to be catchment area for people seeking to avoid the clutches of authority, helps
to explain the flourishing gang activity in the township. With all these factors
it is small wonder that the people of Alexandra would react so vigorously to a penny




Some understanding of the position of the bus company is helpful. The Public
Utility Transport Company (PUTCO) was formed in 1945 taking over licences and
stock from several smaller companies which had serviced locations in the Pretoria
and Johannesburg area. Some of iPUTCO's difficulties can be traced to this
takeover which was on excessively advantageous terms for the companies which were
being bought out (15). But to compound this there were rising costs. By local
standards PUTCO paid high wages and these had risen by fifty per cent since 1945
and the price of buses and spare parts had doubled since then as well (16). Bus
fares on certain routes, which were in any case sub-economic^ had remained static
since the 1930s* PUTCO had in 1954 applied for permission to increase its fares
but this was refused by the cabinet. Then in 1955 the National Transport Commission
(NTC) agreed that PUTCO could raise its weekend fares; the new fares were implemented
though the Alexandra branch of the ANC and other groups tried to oppose them (17).
But this did little to solve PUTCO1s problems: by the end of 1956 the 440
shareholders were in a dissatisfied mood: they had only begun to receive a dividend
in 1952 and at six per cent it was not a generous one (18). In fact PUTCO was able
to pay a dividend only because the Government was subsidizing unprofitable routes
with a grant of £207 475 (First, 1957: 58). The government was reluctant to increase
the subsidy and so the NTC granted an apprehensive PUTCO a fare increase to take
effect on all save Soweto routes from January 7 1957.
2.7
The Alexandra bus boycott lasted three months. The tenacity of PUTCO's efforts
to maintain the new fares was partly motivated by its desperate financial position.
But there was another factor. PUTCO was no ordinary company: as well as providing
the subsidy the Government appointed two of PUTCO1s five directorships and approved
the chairman of the board (First, 1957: 58). The quasi-public nature of the company
could well have contributed to the inflexibility of it's negotiating position.
2.8
In response to PUTCO1 s announcement on the fare rise a meeting was called on
January 2 1957 by the Alexandra Vigilance Committee, a group of community leaders
which amongst its other functions elected two standholder representatives to the
Health Committee. Twenty four people came to the meeting representing six
different groups. These were:
The Standholders and Tenants Association
The African National Congress
The ANC National-minded bloc
The ANC (Madzunya) group
The Movement for Democracy of Content
The Workers League
2.9
The Standholders' Association represented about a thousand people who owned stands
or who rented or sub-let them from external property owners. S Mahlangu and
J.S. Mathebula of the Association became chairman and secretary of the Alexandra
Peoples Transport Committee (APTC) which was formed from those who attended the
meeting. That property owners were to play a leading role in the boycott was to
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be very significant but it is difficult to explain. There does not seem to
have been any intention, as there had been in earlier boycotts, for local
entrepeneurs to establish an alternative bus company though there was a proposal
that African businessmen from Durban should be approached (19). It is possible
that landlords would have been keen to resist rises in the cost of living which
may have affected people's ability to pay rents. But more probably the
standholders would have viewed involvement in the boycott leadership as an
inevitable consequence of their status within the community.
2.10
The ANC had the largest representation on the APTC: three men and three womens'
league members. The ANC had had a tumultuous history in Alexandra recently
because of disputes between Africanists and supporters of the Freedom Charter (see
below). The current leadership was inexperienced and fairly young. Alfred Nzof ,
the branch chairman had only recently joined the ANC. He was employed by the
Health Committee as an Inspector. (Karis, Carter, Gerhart, 1977: 123). The other
leading ANC spokesman was Thomas Nkobi, a laboratory assistant. Up until the
middle 1950s the local ANC had been led by businessmen such as Phineas Nene and
R G Baloyi. That they no longer predominated reflected the increasingly radical
character of the movement at this time. It was important that the boycott
coincided with the opening hearings of the Treason Trial: the Congress leadership
was unable to pay very close attention to the affairs of the branches and for a
time the local ANC was left to take its own initiatives. The presence of women
on the committee was also significant. The League had submitted a memorandum of
transport grievances in 1943 to show how the inadequacies of the system specially
affected women: examples included the plight of washerwomen (servicing the
northern suburbs) who had to deliver their bundles of washing using the overcrowded
buses as well as the situation of any woman at a crowded bus stop where the
strongest will always win the struggle for space on the buses (20). Women were to
be prominent in the initial picketing of bus stops.
2.11
The ANC (Mad^nya) group were a faction which had developed from the disputes
between Africanists and Chartists which were affecting most ANC branches on the
Rand. The dispute essentially concerned the alliance between the ANC, the (white)
Congress of Democrats (COD) and the South African Indian Congress (SAIC) as well
as an ideological shift from a populist exclusive nationalism to a more all-
embracing social democratic position. The Madainy ites were Africanists: after
being expelled from the ANC they formed an African nationalist nucleus in Alexandra.
The Alexandran Africanists were considerably less middle-class in character than-i
those elsewhere (21). They were led by Josias Madainy a who had been ANC branch
chairman until his expulsion in 1955. Madamya was born in Vendaland and arrived
in Johannesburg in 1931 to work as a domestic servant. As a casual labourer he
attended a Communist Party night school and later took a correspondence course in
public speaking. He currently earned his living selling cardboard boxes on a
Johannesburg street corner where he would deliver lengthy political harangues. He
was an energetic activist (he played quite an important part in the Bantu Education
Boycott; Alexandra was one of the few townships to respond) and very outspoken:
"These whites are just bluffing you by saying that they are
friendly to you. They will never be friendly Europeans are
like lice. They are parasites, busy sucking on blood by means of
work for unequal pay". (22)
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Madzunya was a member of the APTC as was one of his colleagues, M Motsele, a
former ANC branch secretary expelled with Madzunya.
2.12
The ANC national minded bloc were a conservative splinter grouping who emerged in
1952 in opposition to cooperation with the SAI ^  and what they alleged to be
communist influence on the nationalist movement. They were led by R V Selope Thema
and were usually given sympathetic coverage in the newspaper he edited until 1952,
The World. It was a small group with a heavy preponderance of relatively wealthy
businessmen. Their Alexandra members included R G Baloyi, a former ANC treasurer
and bus boycott leader of the 1940s and more important in the context of the 1957
boycott, Dan Qjmede. Gmnede was the only member of the APTC who provided a
personal link with the boycotts of the previous decade. In 1942 he was ANC branch
secretary (23). and in the following year he belonged to both the Alexandra Transport
Action Committee and the Anti Expropriation Committee (24).
2.13
The Movement for Democracy of Content seems to have had links with the Unity
Movement and the Society of Young Africa, components of the All African Convention,
in Johannesburg a somewhat ephemeral organisation sharply critical of the ANC.
Democracy of Content was represented on the APTC by Dan Mokonyane who became its
assistant secretary. Mokonyane was a law student at Witwatersrand.
2.14
Finally there was the Workers League, led and represented by George Hlongwe. This
is the least well documented group. An Alexandra Workers Union was involved in bus
fare negotiations in 1942 (25) and in 1955 Hlongwe as leader of the Workers League
Transport Action Committee was proposing a boycott in response to the weekend fare
rises (26)
2.15
So represented on the APTC was a considerable collection of sectional and in some
cases conflicting interests. Broadly these fall into three groups: the property
owners and businessmen, now largely alienated from the local ANC; the political
parties each with a competing popular appeal; groups which confined themselves to
subsistence issues, poor people's movements (27).
2.16
The APTC organised a meeting on Sunday 6th January which was attended by 2000
people. The meeting voted to boycott the buses until the fares were restored to
their old level. The next day the buses ran virtually empty, 15 000 people walked
the nine miles from Alexandra to Johannesburg. Simultaneously boycotts began in
Sophiatown and the Pretoria townships which were also affected by the PUTCO increases
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(see below). Altogether 60,000 people were to stop using the green PUTCO
buses. Many of them had the alternative of a train service but the people
of Alexandra had no such choice; for the next three months they walked to
and from work, 18 miles a day. Several things were important in sustaining
the boycotters1 enthusiasm. First, the boycott committee held frequent open
a i r mass meetings in one or other of the squares in Alexandra. Here speeches
were made by representatives of the different factions and groups, but most .
important of all the people were informed of the progress of negotiations
with the company, the municipality and employers1 organisations, and given a
chance to express their opinions. Decision-making was done at the mass
meeting; a show of hands would determine the acceptance or rejection of
proposed solutions. This direct democracy was crucial in the maintenance
of boycotters1 morale. I t is significant that there was l i t t l e evidence of
any kind of intimidation; even the ' t sots is ' contented themselves with the
levying of a Is. 6d. 'boycott tax1 (28).
2.17
The second point is that there was considerable sympathy for the boycotters
among the white community. This was important for two reasons. First ,
e fforts were made to provide boycotters with l ifts during the early stages
of the boycott. Secondly, i t was not long before various white groups began
to search for a compromise: unlike industrial struggles or overtly political
campaigns the bus boycott seems to have had a much greater chance of
exploiting conflicting interests within the white community. I t is worth
looking at these groups quite closely. Perhaps the one that had the most
influence on the course of events was the Johannesburg branch of the Liberal
P arty. They were to perform a crucial intermediary function between the
employers' organisations and the boycott committees. A white group which had
much closer contacts with the ANC was the Congress of Democrats but they
1 acked the relationship with employers enjoyed by Liberals and in any case
many of their leading members were caught up in the Treason Trial proceedings.
Quite apart from their humanitarian feelings, the Liberals were quite anxious
to increase their influence and membership among the black community;
the boycott offered an excellent opportunity. The Liberals quickly
formed a boycott sub-committee and set about organising a relay of l ifts
(though l i f t giving was by no means restricted to Liberals or COD members).
Members of the committee also began sounding out contacts on the city council
and the Chamber of Commerce. After January 22nd a series of meetings was
held between the Liberal sub-committee and the APTC. Out of these an
important moderating principle was established: the boycotters demands would
not go 'beyond the preservation of pre-boycott fares' (29). This contrasted
both with the Evaton boycott (see below) and previous Alexandra boycotts.
2.18
We will return to the Liberals later. Also very important were the employers
organisations, for i t was their attitude that was going to decide the final
outcome of the boycott. First , the Johannesburg Chamber of Commerce. The
Chamber had played an important role in the 1944-45 boycott negotiations and
on February 23rd i t was to offer to fund a transport allowance which would be
paid to employees. Among the more important employers represented by the
Chamber of Commerce were some who were relatively progressive. One such was
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OK Bazaars Limited. OK Bazaars had a fairly enlightened record. In the
1940s they were willing to negotiate with the black shopworkers union
and their employees were relatively well paid (30). Many of them lived
in Alexandra (31). I t has been suggested that their attitude might have arisen
out of relative vulnerability. A stoppage or reduced efficiency in the
workforce might have rather more costly effects on a regional retailing
system dependent on a single warehouse staffed by that workforce than in
an industrial situation (32). Contrasting with the sympathetic position
towards the boycotters taken by the Johannesburg Chamber of Commerce was the
attitude of the Transvaal Chamber of Industries. This became clear in a
s tatement issued by the Chamber's President, Lulofs,. on January 11th.
I n i t he complained of a sharp increase in the rate of absenteeism (commercial
employers were emphatic that absenteeism had not increased)and a lowered
productivity because of physical exhaustion of the workforce.
He also said that industry was reluctant to subsidise to any further extent
the Natives Services Levy. The Levy was a fund contributed to by industry
and commerce which financed various services and housing projects. Lulofs
pointed out that many employers were exempted from this contribution (e.g.
municipalities, who paid atrociously) (33). Two weeks later, the Chanber
called on boycotters to 'accept their situation'. Plans for long term
s olutions were being formed, i t loftily informed them. Absenteeism would
result in wholesale dismissals (3A). At this stage Industry had been
influenced by the Transport Minister's denunciation of the boycott as being
politically inspired. At the beginning of February Industry said i t was not
prepared to raise wages to end the boycott (a solution advocated with some
force by PUTCO who were one of the best employers in Johannesburg) (35).
Even more striking was Industry's refusal to support the Chamber of Commerce
transport allowance sheme. This was after one of the major industrial
bodies, the Steel and Engineering Industries Federation of South Africa
had decided that the boycott was 'too dangerous to touch" (36).
2.19
The contrasting attitudes of the two employers' organisations need some
explanation. More research is required to bear out the following
possibi l i t ies . First, i t may have been that many of Alexandra's industrial
workers were employed nearby (in Bergvlei and Wynberg) and consequently the
boycott would not have made a great deal of difference to them or their
employers. Second, the Chamber of Industry was a Transvaal body whereas the
Chamber of Commerce represented Johannesburg firms only: in the case of the
latter the Alexandra boycotters as a proportion of their total workforce may
have been more important. Third, Industry may have been penetrated to*a much
greater extent by Afrikaner capital than was the case with Johannesburg
commercial firms, and hence been more receptive to Government injunctions to
have nothing to do with the boycotters.
2.20
But as well as the positions of various organisations one should not neglect
the general sympathy the boycott evoked from Johannesburg's white community
at least until the first terms were rejected. The boycott received a
reasonably warm press and there was also the encouragement of the l i f t s .
The boycott's impact is not difficult to understand: visually i t was dramatic
- the steady procession of men and women marching to and from Alexandra every
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day shouting 'Azikwelwa' (we will not ride) and ?Ha Bongoela' (we don't
drink any more) and 'Gein Ukudla' (keep food for a rainy day)*
and 'Asinimali' (we have no money). And as they walked they sang the boycott
song which was soon to be banned by the South African Broadcasting Corporation,
To get to work the boycotters had to cross nine miles of white residential
areas along a busy main road. For a while the black people of Alexandra
had become visible to the Northern Suburbs.
2.21.
However behind the determination and unity of the people who were walking
to work cracks were beginning to emerge amongst the groups represented on the
APTC. These were the result of moves by the employers and FuTCO itself .
As we have seen the first move came from the Johannesburg Chamber of Commerce
(JCC) when th^ persuaded their members to pay an extra shilling a week
transport allowance. This was refused by the APTC; after all many employers
were not members of the JCC - how would domestic servants and municipal
labourers persuade their employers to give them an extra shilling?
Nevertheless the APTC in collaboration with members of the Liberal Party
drafted a set of proposals for the JCC to consider. PUTCO meanwhile had
produced a ultimatum on February 18th: if the boycott was not called off
by March 1st the buses would be permanently withdrawn. At this point the
Government stepped in. Minister Schoeman had already said that the boycott
w as a political challenge to the state - a boycotters1 victory would be an
ANC victory. He now announced that in the event of PUTCO withdrawing their
buses, no one would be allowed to take over their routes: Alexandra would
n ever have a bus service again (37).
2.22.
This provoked the first erosion in APTC solidarity. A mass meeting was
held on February 20th; i t voted for the boycott to continue. Five days
later a secret meeting was held between six members of the APTC and PUTCO
executives. The six were drawn from the property owners on the committee;
they were led by Mr MahOangu. But though they were beginning to make
conciliatory noises a mass meeting of 5000 people simultaneously again voted
for a continuation. By the beginning of March the divisions were clear:
the Vigilance and Standholders' associations and the ANC national-minded
b loc were trying to reach towards some form of compromise whereas the
other groups were opposed to any concessions being made to PUTCO (38). *"
These lat ter seemed to be reflecting the feelings of the overwhelming
majority of Alexandra residents who had been walking to work for nearly two
months. The standholders1 position was understandable: if there
 w a s t o D e
no bus service for Alexandra in the future they would be ruined, for Alexandra
would lose much of i ts attraction and they would lose their tenants.
2.23.
On February 28th the Chamber of Commerce, in response to APTC proposals,
produced a fresh offer. Employers were to put up a fund of £25,000: this
* An article in 'The Listener1 (London) 25.4.1957 quotes a different version
of this slogan: 'store food and prepare for the offensive1
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would finance a scheme in which people could claim a penny back on a cancelled
ticket at the end of their journey. This was put to the APTC at a meeting
attended also by the Bishop of Johannesburg, Ambrose Reeves (who was working
closely with the Liberals and who had a friendly relationship with Transvaal
ANC leaders), A.B. Xuma and Liberal Party representatives. At this meeting
ten members of the APTC voted in favour of the proposals - including the
ANC representatives. Madzunya, Motsele and Mokonyane voted against them (39)*
On March 1st PUT CO delayed withdrawing i t s buses so that mass meetings could
consider the JCC plan that evening. They were due for a disappointment:
in Alexandra the public meetings rejected the proposals and the Africanist
Motsele burnt a copy of them in front of the crowd (40). Significantly
(see paragraph 2.10) women were said to have organised the main Alexandra
meeting which rejected the proposals (41).
2.24.
By this stage the divisions between the groups represented on the APTC were
public knowledge. The ANC national minded bloc were openly opposing the boycott
(42) while the standholders were discreetly wavering. On March 3rd they had
a meeting where they anxiously discussed the economic implications of the
withdrawal of the bus service (43). The Africanists and Mokonyane, as we
have seen, were totally opposed to any compromise. The position of the ANC
leaders was less clear cut. In the negotiations of the 28th the ANC
representatives voted in favour of the refund scheme. Here i t is possible that
the presence of Reeves and Xuma had a persuasive effect. Both were in favour
of the proposals (44) and the Bishop was closely in touch with the ANC's
national leadership gathered in Johannesburg for the Treason hearings
(Sampson 1958 ) . I t was known that he enjoyed their confidence and
therefore he was in a position to exert considerable pressure on the Alexandra
ANC leaders, some of whom were new to the movement. But i t is also likely
that there was confusion over the choice of strategy among Congress Alliance
leaders. For the day the terms were rejected at the mass meetings a leaflet
was circulating in the township advising people to reject the JCC offer.
The leaflet was issued by the Congress of Democrats and was evocatively
entitled 'What is to be done1 (45). Ruth Firs t , a leading COD member, in her
ar t ic le on the boycott provides some indication of the way the Left within the
Congress movement viewed the boycott:
'The boycott asserted the r igi t of Africans to protest... .those
who would separate the economic background from the political, who
would see the African protesting only against a penny rise in fares,
unmoved and unaffected by Minister Schoeman's "break the boycott"
threats, by the daily police intimidation, by the pin-pricks,
the humiliations and the abject miseries of apartheid, erect
distinctions which must be blown over in the first gusts of any
African protest or campaign1 (First 1957: 63).
Revolutionaries within the Congress movement do not seem to have failed to
percieve the boycott's political significance: theirs was rather a sin of
omission. At no time was there.any evidence that senior left-wing Congressites
actually provided any suggestions to the local leaders as to how to develop
whatever potential the boycott had for more general political action.
That other groups were able to influence the APTC to limit their demands to the
fare alone (see paragraph 2.18) is an indication of the weakness of the Left
a t this time. In the later stages of the boycott there were signs that i t
could develop into a more open challenge requiring a higher level of political
commitment but these owed l i t t l e to the influence of outsiders.
Page.. . /*3.. .
cPage
2.25.
Political considerations aside there were sound material reasons for rejecting
the JCC terms. First the scheme was inconvenient: i t involved queueing
twice rather than once on every journey adding to commuting time. Second,
there was no assurance that there could be a permanent settlement: The
£25,000 would be exhausted in three months. Mokonyane viewed the scheme
as a lure to draw people back on to the buses without any formal commitments
being made. Third, Pretoria had been left out of the scheme. (46) With the
turning down of these terms PUTCO withdrew i t s buses. Bishop Reeves and the
Liberals did not despair: they continued to negotiate with the City Council
and the JCC and also obtained the ANC's agreement that i t would attempt to
persuade boycott committees to accept improved proposals. All these efforts
were fairly secret :both Reeves and the Liberals felt that PUTCO and the APTC
would be made more amenable if they were kept in the dark for a while (47).
2.26.
The State preferred a more heavy-handed approach. The police played a major
role. They patrolled Louis Botha Avenue in force and stopped as many cars
as they could that seemed to be carrying boycotters, subjecting them to checks
on minor traffic regulations. Fivehundred people (mainly illegal taxi
operators) were detained after breaching such rules. Not content with this
petty harrassment the police raided Alexandra twice in February: altogether
14,000 people were held under some pretext (tax defaulting and illegal residence
were the two most common offences) (48). The Government was also making more
long term threats. An official publication stated:
I t was found that of all the townships where boycott attempts were
made, the only really successful boycotts occurred in uncontrolled
townships where no formal authority is exercised over the Bantu
inhabitants in terms of the normal legislation applying to Bantu
townships. I t is also these uncontrolled areas which generally show
the highest crime rates and other distrubances. (49)
It was time, announced the Minister of Native Affairs, to bring Alexandra
1
 under very s t r ic t control'. The proper population of the township should
have been around 30,000 and steps would be taken to reduce i t to that number (50)
The Government obviously viewed the boycott as a major threat. I t devoted
two numbers of i t s Digest to analyses of the boycott replete with sensational
revelations concerning 'underground red workers', 'red termites1, and
' ANC Youth League Stormtroopers1.
2.27.
Such hysteria should be seen in the context of the State's attempt to implicate
the Congress leadership on a treason charge: i t ' s external propaganda should
not therefore be taken altogether at i t s face value. Nevertheless i t is
likely that the authorities were genuinely alarmed by the boycott: efforts
to exploit i ts political implications were not limited to state agencies.
ANC spokesmen were by March claiming that 'the boycott was no longer an
economic struggle but was becoming a polit ical one1 (51). By this time there
were signs of a move to convert the boycott into a form of general strike.
At a mass meeting on February 27 Mokonyane told the people:
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'When we are tired we shall r e s t . . . . They are punishing us
because we are poor....save food and prepare for the offensive* (52)
By the f irst week in March Nzo was actually using the phrase 'stay at home',
a term linked to the South African Congress of Trades Unions '£1 a day1
campaign which was just beginning. Nzo said on March 6 'When we are tired
we will stay at home and wait for commerce and industry to come and fetch us *
for work1 (53). This resolution was to become less ambivalent:
the following week the APTC produced an ultimatum: the city council should
provide transport for the boycotters; if this was not done by Monday the
18th workers would stay at home. (54) Now this may. have to an extent
reflected the onset of fatigue but there is a strong case for arguing that
the ANC was trying to generate a wider political struggle from the boycott.
There is evidence that suggests that the local ANC was thinking in such terms
from the start of the boycott. Amongst the Treason Trial evidence were some
- notes for a speech by Tennyson Makiwane. Makiwane, a defendant in the t r ia l
from 1956 to 1958, had previously lived for two years in Alexandra after his
expulsion from Fort Hare for ANC Youth League act ivi t ies . The notes were for
( a speech made in February 1956. The speech is about the Evaton boycott but
"v. i t seems to have been intended for an Alexandra audience. In i t Makiwane
s uggests that consumer grievances should be linked with those of transport
workers, that a common union should be formed to represent passengers and
workers and that the political organisation should 'link up peoples struggle
for transport in a location into a general struggle of al l people in townships'(55)
Makiwane used to use his lunch breaks in the Treason Trial to consult with
APTC leaders (Karis, Carter and Gerhart 1977: ) . In broad outline this
did approximate the strategy the ANC was pursuing in the February/March period.
In Alexandra itself i t would have been difficult for passengers to make common
cause with PUTCO staff: their interests were diametrically opposed; PUTCO
employees were better paid than most Alexandra workers and were faced by the
threat of losing their jobs. However in Bloemfontein, where the local ANC
tr ied ineffectively to organise a 'sympathy boycott1 issues included the
upgrading of black staff into jobs reserved for whites (56). The sympathy
boycotts were to effect East London, Randfontein, Port Elizabeth, Geradston,
Moroka-Jabavu, and Edenvale. These were in addition to the boycotts which
arose from the PUTCO fare increase (Pretoria, Sophiatown and Western Native
Townships). In each centre Peoples Transport Committees were formed and
(. despite the frequent opposition of Advisory Boards they could be, as in the
case of the Eastern Province centres, ninety per cent effective. Though the
ANC was accused of using the boycotts 'solely for a political purpose....
not economic1 (57) these sympathy protests were linked to local issues:
in Bloemfontein, for example, as well as the question of black staff the
municipality were also accused of using profits derived from black bus services
to subsidise white faci l i t ies . For the main boycott centres (Alexandra^
Pretoria and Sophiatown) a coordinating committee was established: this
was chaired by Alfred Nzo for the Alexandra ANC. In Alexandra the ANC
underwent a massive expansion in membership, from 600 to 6000, making i t one
of the largest branches in the country. The degree of politicisation
o f the boycott was perhaps indicated at the Alexandra meeting where Nzo
f i r s t mentioned a stay-at-home. The Africanists were also present. Mr Motsele
spoke of Ghanaian independence and of Nkrumah. There were cries of 'Afrika!f
and 'This is our mother country. We will die first! '(58)
2.28.
However there was to be no stay-at-home on March 18. Instead negotiations began
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with the ANC playing an intermediary role between the Peoples Transport
Committees (PTCs) and PUTCO, Chamber of Commerce, Municipality and Liberal
Party representatives. The fresh proposals were based on a coupon system:
people at the beginning of the week would buy a book of coupons with the effect
that the 5d tickets would cost 4d. The Chamber of Commerce would make up
the difference to PUTCO. By the time the JCC funds were exhausted i t was
hoped that the JCC and the Municipality would have succeeded in obtaining a "
r ise in the Native Services Levy. The ANC undertook to persuade the PTCs
to accept the proposals on condition that the deal would include Pretoria.
The Bishop and Liberals agreed to look for sources to fund coupons in Pretoria.
There was also a general undertaking that employers organisations would
encourage a rise in wages. In response to this latter point the ANC, when
i t presented the settlement terms to the community, included the demand of
a £1 daily wage. (59)
2.29.
The events of the final week of the boycott were complex; they resulted from
a threefold spl i t between the APTC leaders. I t seems clear that the local
ANC were under considerable pressure from the national leadership who seem
t o have been open to influence from Reeves and Liberal spokesmen (Sampson 1933: )
Meanwhile the property owners had made a completely independent secret approach
to PUTCO guaranteeing an acceptance of the coupon system regardless of whether
i t was implemented in Pretoria. Obviously they were seriously worried by
Verwoerd's declared intention to reduce the township population and were not
p repared to risk any possibility of a continuation of the boycott in the hope
that if a settlement was reached the attention of the authorities would be
diverted elsewhere (see paragraph 2.26.). PUTCO agreed to reintroduce
the buses if enough people turned up to ride them on Monday morning. Mokonyane,
for reasons that will be explored below remained opposed to a settlement whilst
the Africanists were undecided. On Sunday March 31 public meetings were held
i n al l boycott centres. These voted for an acceptance of the terms provided
a) that they were approved by Alexandra residents, and b) that Pretoria
was included. On the 31st three meetings were held simultaneously in
Alexandra - two were organised by pro settlement factions (who had published
a circular the day before advocating a return to the buses) and one by the
res t of the APTC. The lat ter meeting was by far the best attended. Despite
the intentions of the ANC i t rejected the proposals. I t was felt that
a) the coupons because they had 5d printed on them were intended to condition
people to pay 5d. when the JCC money ran out, and b) that PUTCO should pay
compensation for police action, arrests and deaths (in Pretoria) that had
occurred during the boycott (60). By now there was total confusion. *
Liberals met APTC leaders on Sunday evening and attacked them for failing to
unanimously support the settlement at the meeting whereupon some promised to
urge the people to reverse the decision. On Monday PUTCO buses were reintroduced
and in the absence of any clear directions and indeed conflicting advice in
p amphlets from the ANC (declaring a victory and telling people they could ride
the buses) and from the non ANC members of the APTC (see below) once again
people started using the buses. In Alexandra the boycott was over.
2.29.
It is difficult to evaluate the ANC's decision to accept the terms and end the
boycott. As well as looking at the pros and cons of continuation i t is
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necessary to come to some assessment of the ANC's strategy throughout the
boycott. The case against settlement included the following points:
2.29.1
First , the offer was a temporary one: there was no guarantee that the
Government would heed the Chamber of Commerce or the Johannesburg City Council
Significantly the Afrikaanse Sakekamer had refused al l along to support the
JCC. As an APTC leaflet distributed on April 7 put i t :
When the £25»COO runs out from the Chamber of Commerce - what
then? We cannot sell our-fourteen weeks struggle for a twelve weeks
settlement. The Government has promised to step in when the boycott
is smashed and the Chamber is bankrupt to bring about permanent their
permanent settlement. Why drive the Chamber to bankruptcy, why drive
the people to distraction? An authorxty which behaves in this way
( . is highly suspect. We refuse to settle our economic affairs on the
basis of PROMISES - from the enemy. Since when must we have
confidence in a white government who are the source of our ruin?
(Karis Carter 1977: ) .
The ANC and the Standholders by accepting the offer had sold out, 'they (had)
t r ied to sell out many times' (ibid). The JCC was 'prepared to spend
£25,000 now in killing the boycott in order to guarantee hundreds of thousands
profit in the future1 (61). At the time the arguement had some force to i t .
A permanent settlement was by no means a certainty. The Minister of
Transport did agree in May to raise the Native Services Levy - but only if
b oth the main employers organisations agreed. For two months employers
wer divided on the issue, Commerce favouring the scheme but Industry being
1
 adamant1 in i ts opposition to the scheme (62). Industrial employers were
only to extend their backing grudgingly and slowly.
2.29.2
The second point (which may have tipped the balance in favour of settlement)
was that the situation in the townships was hardly stable either. As an
APTC leaflet of April 14 pointed out:
Wherever we look there is confusion. Some people proclaim a victory,
others say. . . . the boycott must go on. Some people ride. ""
others carry on walking. (63)
Liberals by the beginning of May were seriously worried that the boycott might
b e restarted. The APTC leaders (including the local ANC men) had been left
outof the negotiations with the Minister and the employers: fThey feel
isolated, hurt, slighted and do not know what to t e l l their people.. . . f i r s t
lesson of the boycott, consultation, has already been forgotten by the Europeans'(64)
Had in fact the boycott exhausted i t s potential? Would the people of Alexandra
have gone on walking? The main meeting in Alexandra did reject the scheme:
i t was attended by 5000 people and i t was held on a Sunday (so the APTC could
not be accused of holding a meeting when most of the normal bus users were
s t i l l at work or on the way home). Against this one must bear in mind that
people were getting very tired: the theme of exhuastion is very common in
the later boycott speeches. With the removal of the buses in March one of the
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objective tests of the boycott's effectiveness was gone1 - there was nothing
to boycott. However a unified leadership may have exploited the situation
more deftly: a recurrent theme of APTC leaflets after April 1st was that
1
 if we, the people, having united on this issue, won a victory, we would feel
our strength and continue to figjit for much more then Id1. (65) So i t was
possible to argue that acceptance of the deal dissipated the strength and
unity built up over three months. We will return to this in a moment.
2.29.3
The third point favouring continuation was that the coupon scheme was
applicable to the Johannesburg routes only; i t was not going to apply to
Pretoria where there were separate employeisorganisations who were completely
opposed to raising the contribution to the Native Services Levy (66). The
Pretoria boycott was going to continue into 1958 without enjoying any support
from elsewhere. The development of the Pretoria boycott requires some
( explanation. First , even compared to Alexandra people in Pretoria locations
were poor. Early in the boycott a special report was produced by the Manager
of the Non-European Affairs Department. Seventy percent of Pretoria's
black population earned less than £9.00 a month. The last wage award had
been in 1942. To give some idea of the impact of the Id fare rise the
b udget of a family in Vlakfontein is illuminating. Municipal rents
were £2.7s.3d. Monthly transport costs were £2.As.3d. This left less than
£5 for everything else (67). The leadership and impetus of the Pretoria
boycott came from Lady Selbourne, like Alexandra a freehold township. Here
even the relatively conservative Advisory Board was in favour of the boycott(68)
Women played an especially important role in the Pretoria boycott. I t was
reported in a case at Mooiplas location in January that:
The menfolk want to use the buses but the women insist on
the boycott continuing and are apparently prepared to use force
to prevent the use of the buses (69).
Because of the domestic division of labour women could be expected to be
more sensitive to issues of subsistence than men: as Yawitch has suggested
C women react strongly to conditions that threaten the continued reproduction
of the family (70). There seem to have been fewer political rivals to the
ANC's position than was the case in Alexandra. However the ANC was
fairly weak and inexperienced: the branch had been reformed after a period
of inactivity in 1955 (71). This was possibly one reason why the Pretoria
b oycotters never succeeded after the Alexandra settlement in mobilising the
ANC nationally in the way that Alexandra had. Alexandra's branch, over the
years had contributed many people who now had important functions within the
organisation. This was not the case with Pretoria - and this may have
h ad the effect of making them more autonomous but less influential with the
national leadership. But poverty and ANC autonomy are not the only factors
that explain the extraordinary resilience of the 10,000 boycotters of Pretoria.
Unlike the people of Alexandra most of them had the alternative of a train
service: indeed in December 1958 Lady Selbourne PTC requested that PUTCO
services should be permanently withdrawn. The trains were cheaper and the
station was nearer the centre of the location than was the bus terminus (72).
Hence the boycott cuased rather less hardship than elsewhere. Nevertheless
this did not prevent moments of considerable bitterness: during the boycott
b uses were burnt as was an office of the peri-urban areas board and a man was
killed and several were wounded when the police broke up meetings during the
early stages of the boycott. The only concessions offered to the Pretoria
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committees were a) the inclusion, because of i t s geographical position,
of Vlakfontein in the Johannesburg settlement, and b) the shortening of
some bus routes for the old fare price.
2.29.4
Consequently there was considerable bitterness among Pretoria boycotters when
they found that they had been deserted by Alexandra: after all they had been
united under a single coordinating committee. It is not surprising that
some of the main defections from the ANC when the Pan Africanist Congress
was formed were in the Pretoria townships.
2.30
(•• But a strong case could be made for accepting the JCC proposals as they stood:
2.30.1
Though the remnants of the APTC did contend that settlement involved a retreat
from a strategically advantageous position of strength and unity (see
paragraph 2.29.2) i t might be said that settlement was the best option if
maximum unity was to be preserved. Certainly, the situation was volatile
after April 1st, but the reintroduction of the bus service and the coupon
system were substantial temptations for those who were tired. A
continuation would probably have provoked deeper divisions in the community
than settlement: Mokonyane's meetings thereafter in which he called on
Alexandra to come out in support of Pretoria had a certain moral force but
1 i t t l e impact.
2.30.2
There was much less morale-boosting sympathy from the white community:
this notably declined after the rejection of the JCC refund scheme. Fewer
l i f t s were being offered and press coverage was increasingly impatient,
not to say hostile. As argued previously the feeling that the boycott was
having an impact on the white community helped to encourage a realisation
that victory was possible.
2.30.3
Then, the JCC offer at the end of March may have been the last chance of even
a part ial victory: if the offer had been rejected i t may never have been
repeated. PUTCO had lost nearly £90,000 as a result of the boycott(73):
i f the boycott had continued PUTCO's losses may have been so severe that no
increase in the Native Services Levy that employers would have been willing
to contemplate,would have made them good. As we have seen the Alexandra
ANC leaders were far more open to pressure from above than were the Africanists
or Mokonyane. Pressure from above came from people who could more sensitively
gauge the mood of civic and business leaders.
Page. . .19/ . . .
Page 19.
2.30.4
The final and seemingly clinching arguement in favour of the ANC's decision
was that the national movement, to use Mokonayane's words, was able 'to
pick the fruit1 of the struggle of Alexandra. On June 26th, SACTU and the
ANC called a national stay-at-home as part of the £1 a day campaign. In
Johannesburg, 80 per cent of the work force stayed away, in Alexandra the
'turn out1 was 90 per cent. In response the JCC offered an 'across the
board increase1 of five shillings a week; this was derisively rejected by
SACTU. Obviously the boycott had generated enthusiasm and receptiveness
to ANC calls among the Johannesburg population and .in this context i t was
important that APTC leaders had situated the boycott in the struggle between
capital and labour:
'Then also Commerce and Industry showed the same fear of the
peoples strength. And they were immediately hit by the
peoples struggle. Tired workers are bad workers and they saw their
production and therefore PROFITS dropping. From the very beginning
they tried frantically for a 'settlement1 trying to negotiate with
the committee behind closed doors so that militant people would
have no check on what was happening, offering complicated 'schemes'
and even vague promises of wage increases. All this in an
attempt to destroy our struggle. They are not humanitarians, they
did not offer their £25,000 'for the love of the people*.
They know full well that this money will be gone in three months time.
They are prepared to spend £25,000 now in killing the boycott in
order to guarantee hundreds of thousands profit in the future... . '(74)
2.31.
Out of the dilemna of whether to jettison Pretoria in order to conserve
thei r Alexandra base, or to take a principled position and perhaps erode
their strength in Alexandra and retain support in what was never a strong ANC
area, the ANC chose the tactically correct option. But in general strategic
terms they were open to criticism. First , there were moments of inconsistency
i n the conduct of ANC leaders during the boycott which suggest that they
lacked a clear vision of how the boycott could be developed. The acceptance
of the second JCC offer, the call for a stay-away in March only to be
followed by a hasty withdrawal to the negotiating table, the early assurances
by the national leadership that they would persuade local leaders to accept
the coupon system: these do not suggest a long term strategy nor do they
indicate a very high valuation being placed on the process of popular flecision-
making that was such an important feature of the boycott. And this leads one
to the second major flaw in the ANC's approach: they did not attempt in any
real sense to ' institutionalise' the popular power, the popular political
participation, that had developed out of the boycott. True, they drew on
i t s energy for the June 26th stay-at-home, but this demonstrative effort did
l i t t l e to perpetuate or constructively channel the forces of the boycott.
Here an interesting comparison can be made with the 1944-45 boycott in which
communists urged people to go on walking despite the fare settlement until
the transport system was socialised (75). Of more obvious relevance to
the 1957 situation was the Evaton settlement which placed considerable power
in the hands of the Peoples Transport Committee (see below). But in
Alexandra, as we have seen, the APTC was influenced to limit i ts concerns
to the fare rise (see paragraph 2.17.). Nevertheless the democratic forms
of the boycott c.ould have been adapted to permanent and far-reaching structures
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with enterprising political leadership: an informal popular township
administration might have been a possibility. Then there were issues
which arose out of internal class differentiations: landlords had shown
themselves as a distinct interest group during the boycott, surely a move to
create some form of rent control mechanism would have been widely acceptable?
Though in general the ANC made a valuable contribution to the blossoming
of the boycott movement L t can be contended that having picked i t they
then threw away the fruit.
3.1
The following analysis of the Evaton boycott will begin with a bare
chronology. Out of this will arise several questions and in answering then some
comparisms will be drawn with the Alexandra protest. The treatment will close with
an evaluation of the Evaton settlement. We will then be in a position to resolve
some of the issues raised at the beginning of this paper.
3.2
The first post-war bus boycott in Evaton, a towaship situated 12 miles from the
Vereeniging/ Vanderbijl Park industrial complex and 30 miles from Johannesburg,
took place in January 1950. The bus company had decided to collect passengers
on the Evaton-Vereeniging route from the edges of the township as tarmac roads did
not extend within its boundries (75). Then in August 1954 there was a one day
token boycott in protest against the inefficiency of the service between Evaton
and Johannesburg provided by the Evaton Passenger Company (EPC). The director of
the EPC, a Mr V d'Agnese suggested that a liason committee of influential Evaton
inhabitants should be formed and on August 24 1954 the Evaton Peoples Transport
Council (EPTC) was elected at a public meeting (76). That same month the EPC
applied for a fare increase and despite EPTC protests it was granted by.the
Road Transportation Board. In October 1954 a boycott took place in Kliptown,
another community served by Klip town, another community served by the EPC. The boycc
was successful: after four weeks during which 6 000 people walked daily to
Nancefield railway station a sixpenny weekly fare rise was withdrawn and improvements
in the service were promised by d'Agnese (77). Towards the end of this boycott a joi
meeting was held between the Kliptown Bus Committee and the EPTC to discuss d'Agnese1 s
application for a fare increase on the Evaton - Johannesburg route (78). The
two communities decided to coordinate their activities. Early in 1955 an EPC bus
boke down one night on a level crossing* Ten people were killed by the oncoming
train (79).
3.3
In July 1955 the EPTC issued a bulletin calling for a public meeting on July 24.
At this meeting the 2 500 users of the Evaton-Johannesburg service resolved to
boycott the EPC until the monthly and weekly fares were reduced to their old
levels, that is, from £2 15s to £2 5s and from 18s to 15s respectively (80). The
following morning people began walking to Nancefield railway station at 4 a m.
Buses carrying passengers were stopped by pickets and people were told to get off.
They boycott also affected nearby*Annandale. Much of the picketing was done by
groups of women (81). The following day a woman was even Page.../2l..
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to throw herself in the path of a moving bus to halt its progress (82). For
the next seven weeks buses were picketed and stoned and there were occasional clashes
between police, boycotters and an anti boycott group which was beginning to
coalesce round Ralekeke Rantube, the leader of.Evaton's Basotho community.
This tension came to a head on September 7 when two attempts (one successful)
were made to burn out buses which had entered the location. The EPC then withdrew
its buses altogether until October 24. One incident that occurred d wing this
interval deserves mention?* on September 25 a car fixed up with a loudspeaker
toured the location. The men inside announced their intention to establish an
African-owned bus service for Evaton (83). The wreck of the car was discovered
the next day in Evaton.
3.4
On October 24 the EPC resumed its service. The buses were greeted by large angry
crowds, stones and roadblocks. That afternoon a procession of about one
thousand people marched through Evaton. Fighting broke out between pro-boycotters
/- and Ralekeke Rantubers followers, the 'Russians'. Two boycotters were killed and
• •' Rantube's house was damaged. The conflict was deepened in October when the
EPC took to employing Ralekeke and several other Basothos to protect the buses and
attack picketlines (8,4). In December five boycott supporters were murdered
including Khabutlane, a Basotho sub-chief (85).
3.5
At some point during early 1956 the EFTC applied for four National Transport
Board certificates and announced its intention of establishing a bus service for
the community. Meanwhile the boycott went on with sporadic outbreaks of tension.
EPC employees were taking the brunt of the boycotters' anger and on May 6 a
bus conductor, Johnson Choke, was badly beaten up and died from his injuries
shortly afterwards. In the days preceding as well as the day of his funeral, May 11,
Basotho groups boarded buses on their, way to Evaton, and rode into the location
in them, emerging at the terminus to assault the picketers. Sustained fighting
between armed groups of boycotters and 'Russians' tookplace between 24th and 29th
June. Nine people were killed altogether, several houses were destroyed, thousands
of people sought refuge on the ground surrounding the local police station (Evaton's
V population was estimated to have fallen by forty per cent - 20 000- during these
troubles) (86). A hundred policemen armed with sten guns were needed to control
the situation. The police prevailed upon the EPTC leader Molefi and Rantube
to go through the motions of a public peacemaking and shortly afterwards the
violence simmered down. At this point the bus company announced that the old
fares would be reintroduced (87). It would seem that at this stage the* EFTC leaders
were in favour of a settlement but the public feeling against the EFC was too
bitter for a return to the status quo to be sufficient. A meeting was held which
rejected the settlement and collected £23'lita 7jd towards boycott funds (88). An
EPTC meeting was held on July 10. At. this it was decided to negotiate on the basis
of the following demands (in addition to the maintenance of pre-boycott fares):
Sunday workers should be able to.use their normal weekly or monthly season
tickets; a concessionary student rate should be introduced; the bus depot and
booking office should be located within the township; a penalty clause should
be included within the settlement making the EPC liable to a payment if it took
action without consulting the EPTC (89). On August 11 the EPC and the EPTC met to
negotiate and managed to come to an agreement. Some of the above terms were
incorporated into the settlement which was made public on August 19. As well as the
pre-boycott fares remaining operative, the EPC gave an undertaking that £500
would be paid to the EPTC if the afre was increased or if it sold interests without
consultation. In addition the EPC would run its buses on the basis of a timetable
drawn up by the EPTC, fifty per cent of the inspectors were to be black and
shelters w6uld be constructed at the Evaton and Johannesburg terminals (90)
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At this point the EPTC managed to satisfy rank and file boycotters that they had won
a substantial victory and shortly thereafter the EPC buses began to carry their full
complement of passengers to Johannesburg. The boycott had ended but at a cost of
fifteen deaths, the polarisation of the Evaton community and £52 000 in lost fares to
the company (91).
3.6
Several questions seem immediatly relevant. First, why did the boycott (which only
affected the immediate interests of 2 500 bus users and their dependants) create such
a deep rift in the community? More particularly, why did Rantube and his followers
oppose the boycott? Secondly, what role did any political organisations play in the
events; were there any attempts to develop the boycott into a more deliberate
self-conscious political movement? Thirdly, how do we interpret the settlement:
why did the EPC make such important concessions and what were their implications?
First of all, though, it is useful to have some knowledge of the type of
community Evaton was.
3.7
Evaton's origins are similar to Alexandra's. The area originally belonged to a land
speculation company which began selling off allotments to Africans in 1905. Its
formal status as a released freehold African area was confirmed by the 1936 Land
Act. At first the location mainly accomodated farm labourers but with the dvelopment
of manufacturing industry the population was to treble in ten years: from 10 000
in 1936 to 30 000 in 1946 (92). The population, continued to expand thereafter though
at a more modest rate: in 1955 Evaton was believed to have 50 000 inhabitants (93).
Evaton was divided by a stream into two areas: the location proper and Evaton Small
Farms. Despite its name, the Small Farms area was considerably more congested
than Evaton location. This was because allotments there were sold during the 1930s
to meet the expansion of demand: they - were smaller, and relatively more expensive
(a high initial price being, as we have seen with the. case of Alexandra, an
impetus for rack-renting) (94). Evaton had an even lighter degree of administration
than Alexandra. A health committee which was the.most rudimentary form of local
government did not exist: no whites from the surrounding area could be found who were
willing to serve on such a body (95). Instead there was a Native Commissioner, and,
to assist him in his duties, 22 policemen. The lack of an administrative body compar;
even to Alexandra's meant that there was very little in the way of services. A
more positive side of this neglect, as far as the people of Evaton were concerned,
was that they did not pay rates (96) and they were free from many influx control
restrictions (97). However during the.1940s local ANC leaders had been pressing for
self government in the form of a local authority which would include six elected
Africans and three nominated members. Nothing was done about this largely because of
the unwillingness of the Department of Native Affairs to finance the facilities
which would arise out of bringing the location into administrative conformity
with other townships (98). A factor to keep in mind is this undercurrent of
discontent with the way the community was governed.
3.8
Arising from its unusual status and freedom from external controls Evaton was most
attractive for people who might have found it difficult to legally live in any other
location as well as those who had more complicated reasons for avoiding the
authorities. Because of the absence of rates and the possibility of growing or
foraging foodstuffs (99) it was relatively cheaper to live in. Consequently Evaton
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had a fairly large unemployed group. A major proportion of these people were
Basotho migrants who had worked out their contracts on the mines. Some of them
were involved in criminal protection rackets harrassing the hundred-odd traders
who operated within or around Evaton (100). There were approximately 2 000
Basothos altogether in Evaton (101). From their number the Native Commissioner
chose a'chief1 to 'stop people doing bad1 (162). The Basothos mainly lived in the
Small Farms area: here conditions were mostcrowded and uncomfortable and rooms
were cheaper (103). But as well as i t s attractions for a lumpetiprole tar iat \
the Evaton population also included a significant petty-bougeoise group represented
by the Evaton Property Owners and Residents Association. Traders must have done well
Evaton as they were well insulated from Johannesburg competition. A symptom of their
prosperity may have been the formation in 1956 of the first African turf club in
South Africa: i t had six race meetings before i t was forbidden the use of the
ground on which i t had improvised a race course (104).
3.9
Evaton's population was prevented under section 10 of the Native (Urban Areas)
Consolidation Act of 1945 from finding work in the Vereeniging/Vanderbijl Park
,r area - the major employment centre nearest to Evaton (105)^ So instead 2 500
'• people commuted sixty miles a day to and from Johannesburg. The rest of the
population who were not involved in the informal sector or in shopkeeping would
have had to pick up what work they could in the surrounding white-occupied areas: farr
labourers, domestic servants, service workers and so forth. The post-war
restriction of employment opportunities for Evaton's inhabitants helps to explain
the slackening in its rate of population expansion.
3.10
To sum up, Evaton was a community which like Alexandra had developed organically,
which was negligeably administered with little in the way of coercive sanctions of
authority. In 1956 it had fairly longstanding grievances: the uncertainty of its
municipal status was coupled with insecurity of property owners who coudd not obtain
deeds of transfer (Mphahlele 1957: 57), an insecurity which may have filtered
downwards and been reinforced by the presence of organised criminal groups (Mphahlele
claims that Evaton was a refuge for Johannesburg gangsters) and the threat of
unemployment. It seems likely that the 2 500 Johannesburg commuters represented a
f relatively priviliged group: Johannesburg wages were higher than elsewhere on the
^ Rand and they were earning enough to make the expenditure of £2 5s a month (and
considerably greater expenditure on train fares during the bus boycott) worth while.
3.11
Transport facilities were considerably worse than those provided by PUTCO to
Johannesburg's townships. The Evaton Passenger Service was a small privately owned
concern which operated seventeen buses on the Evaton-Johannesburg route. The company.
because it serviced a community which lay outside the borders of a major municipal
area, did not benifit from any subsidy or Native Services Levy. The company had
taken over from Dickenson's bus service which had been unable to make a profit on the
route (106). It was owned by a group of Johannesburg businessmen known by the
boycotters as 'the Italians1. Fares had risen by 25 per cent since 1945 but the servi
had not improved. The buses were old, they let in the rain, and frequently broke
down, sometimes at night which meant that people would have to sleep out of doors
until the morning. They were often late, always overcrowded, there were no
shelters at the terminals, and the staff, in particular those who managed the bus
queues, treated passengers badly (107). Then there was the apalling incident of
the train crash when an EPC bus had stopped on a railway line. Nevertheless
despite these shortcomings the bus was preferable to the train: the bus journey





As we have seen the EPC directors were conscious of these faults, and hoping to
allay some of the discontent, suggested that a consultative body should be
constituted to advise them on transport problems. The composition of the Transport
Council was interesting: unlike the corresponding organisation in Alexandra,
leading members of the Property Owners Association were not represented on the
committee. The EPTC had a core of nine members: they included two shopkeepers,
four factory workers, one law student, one manufacturer's representative and one
articled clerk (108). Its Chairman and Secretary were both ANC members and
adherents of the Africanist line. In 1955, the Chairman, Vus'umzi Make was 24.
He had joined the ANC Youth League at school, had lived in Evaton all his life and
was studying law. Joe Molefi, EPTC Secretary, was a year older than Make. He
was born in the Free State but moved to Evaton at the age of nine. He went to
secondary school at St. Peters, Johannesburg, where he was taught by Oliver Tambo,
one of the original Africanist founders of the Youth League. On leaving St. Peters
(where he had joinedt the ANC) he studied medicine at the University of the
Witwatersrand. At thattime he lived in Alexandra, where in 1952, having given
up medicine he helped to organise Defiance Campaign volunteers. After serving
as branch secretary in Alexandra he moved to Evaton in 1953 to organise the ANC
there which under his influence became strongly Africanist. Meanwhile he worked
as a company representative (109). Also members of the EPTC were two Transvaal
Indian Congress activists, Suleiman Nathie and Mohammed Ismal (sometimes spelt
Asmal), both shopkeepers. All the EPTC were fairly young men in their twenties or
early thirties. It is significant that the EPTC had a relatively experienced
political leadership but one that was at odds with the ANC establishment: indeed it
was later claimed in court that ' the ANC had nothing to do with the boycott
and took very little part in it* (though by this stagenthey ANC leadership may have
Atbeen anxious not to be implementd in a murder trial)' JWApart from the shopkeepers
the EPTC was reasonably representative of the sort of people who might be expected
to use the bus to Johannesburg.
3.13
However the one group it did not represent were the Basotho residents and it is
to them that we now turn. Nobody has ever provided a very satisfactory explanation
of just why the Basothos should have opposed the boycott. Their violence is attribut
to the anti-social nature of the 'Russians' whose behaviour conformed to a widely
held stereotype of the Basotho being an especially violent people (111). The
Russians originated in Newclare which did have a substantial Basotho colony. They
organised a protection racket which became notorious and which led to fighting in
1952 (Huddleston 1956: 101-102). It should not need to be said that th'e Russians
were not the only gang in Joahannesburg, neither were all Basothos gangsters, nor
were all gangsters Basothos. However, partly as a result of the conduct of the
blanketed Russians of Newclare the popular press tended to identify all Basotho
migrant workers as Russians. This sort of stereotyping was sometimes deliberately
exploited as in the case of the Dube Hostel riots of 1957 when gangsters would disguis
themselves as Basothos and assault and rob Zulu workers and then present themselves
as Zulus robbing the Basothos. This was considerably facilitated by ethnic
grouping in seperate buildings (112). In the same way it is quite likely that the
Basotho community in Evaton was being similarly stereotyped at the onset of the
boycott by the activities of a small group and were then forced into a defensive
solidarity after being attacked indiscriminately. And indeed, one of Ralekeke's rival
Khabutlane, made a point of emphasizing that not all Basothos opposed the boycott (IK
That there was a network of protection|extortion groups known as Russians who were
Basotho can be explained without recourse to generalisations about ethnic
characteristics: Basutoland, a desperately poor country, exports half its economic-
-ally active male population to South Africa at any one time: those
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who for one reason or another were no longer engaged under contract would
probably do their best to remain in South African urban centres: chances of
adequate subsistence, let alone a cash wage in Basutoland were Limited (Wilson
1972: 110). Consequently unemployed Basotho migrants could be expected to form
a fairly important element within the informal sector: without skills, family,
or capital resources they would have to resort to the less legitimate fringes
of that sector. And in one important sense they had a considerable advantage
over other participants in this field: being non-Union citizens there were fewer
restrictions on their movements. It is interesting that the leaders of two -
major groups of Russians, Hlalele of Newclare, and Ralekeke of Evaton, knew
each other from the time they had worked together on the mines (114). Aside
from these general considerations there are factors specific to Evaton which
help to explain the lines along which tension developed.
3.14
The Native Commissioner appointed a chief for the Basotho migrant community. He
had an ill-defined status but considerable informal power. Ralekeke was placed
in this position in 1952. The previous year he had come out of prison after
serving a two year sentence for killing a previous incumbent, Palama. From
1952 he worked for a tailor in Evaton (115). The Basothos lived in the Small
Farms area of Evaton - the poorer district. In some of Ralekeke1s speeches
there is an underlying theme of antagonism towards ' educated people' , of
resentment that he, Ralekeke, a recognised leader in the Evaton community had been
slighted because he had not been consulted by the boycott planners (who, as we have
seen in the composition of the EPTC, were, often well-educated men in better paid
jobs that the majority of the population}'(116). It is possible that the inclusion
of shopkeepers on the EPTC may have also contributed to the antagonism of an
underpriviliged group to the boycott. But, apart from the Basothos' feelings about
the boycott there was also the way they were percieved by the rest of the
community. Whatever the conduct of the majority of Basotho residents, in a
position of authority over them was a man with two convictions for violent assault
and a known involvement in gangster activities. There was also a more generalised
resentment: the Native Affairs Commission reporting in 1947 mentions complaints
in Evaton that whereas Basuto citizens were free to seek employment in
Vereeniging whereas people who had been born in Evaton were prevented from doing
so by the Native (Urban Areas Consolidation) Act (117). Given such tensions and the
prevalence of certain stereotyped perceptions (which were at least indirectly stimula^
by official policies) the rift that came to light in the boycott becomes easier
to understand. Fairly early on (the records are unclear as to exactly when, but at
least by October) the EPC started drawing upon the services of a strongarm squad to
break pickets, paying them between £2 and £3 a week (118). Naturally it found them
amongst the most isolated and alienated sector of the community. Apart from the
dozen or so of his followers employed like himself by the EPC, Ralekeke was able
to involve larger numbers of Basothos in the struggle against the uoycotters: they
need not al have been Russians - those that opposed him were summaralily dealt
with (see paragraph 3.13), fear could have been an important factor. Ralekeke was
able to reinforce his position by calling upon other Russian groups elsewhere on
the Rand (119).
3.15
It should not be thought that the Russians were the only people who opposed te
the boycott: the EPC only served a minority of the community and most of Evaton1 s
inhabitants would not have been materially affected by the increase. For example,
a prominent independent African church leader, Bishop Sims, was outspoken in his
opposition (Mphahlele 1956: 22) and was later killed. But the involvement of the
gangsters on the side of the bus company would probably have created considerable
sympathy for the boycotters1 cause among those who were not immediatly affected
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by the fare rise.
3.16
Given the length of the boycott (the reasons for which will be explored in a
moment), the involvement of local political leaders, and the passions it seems to
have aroused,it is a little surprising that the ANC should have done so little to
help the boycotters (there were no sympathy boycotts) and that it did not really
attempt to make any political capital from it. It is true that the -National
Chairman of the Youth League, Robert Res ha, did visit Evaton - in his speech he
declared that unless the people of Evaton had their own transport system there would
never be any peace - but this was an exceptional instance of interest by a member
of the National Executive. It is possible that the ANC were wary of the Africanist
element involved (for that reason the Evaton branch may have been considered with
disfavour) and it is also likely that the violence involved may have caused the
ANC leadership to be cautious. The EPTC recieved some encouragement from
Africanist groups elsewhere (120). However in their leaflets and bulletins (121)
one does not find any attempt to situate the boycott in any wider context than the
r-_ struggle between bus company and passengers. This, despite the fact that the police
'-. and courts were believed to be acting in collusion with the bus company and
the Russians. However despite the absence of a self-consciously 'political1
character to the boycott it did have an aspect which could have developed political
implications. Unlike the case of Alexandra in 1957, there can be detected in the
conduct of the boycott, a recurrent theme of economic self-help. The EPTC from the
start had shown itself to be extremely effective in fundraising: by the fifth week
several of its leaders were on bail after having been arrested for picketing - the
bail money collected amounted to £250. It was perhaps this and Resha*s suggestion
that prompted the EPTC to apply for four certificates from the Road Transportation
Board so it could run buses on the EPC routes. It was then to contest the EPC's
efforts to renew its license, though no significant sum was collected towards
the project. The interesting thing is that these plans did not involve the
wealthier businessmen of the Property Owners' Association; they had entered into
quite seperate negotiations to establish a private bus company (122). The EPTC
project may have been motivated by the idea of establishing a service which would be
properly responsive to consumer needs, a service over which bus users would have
some control. The project does not seem to have sprung from a desire for
economic aggrandisement among members of the EPTC. As we have seen fares were not
/ the only issue involved in the dispute. If a community bus service had been
v established ; it could have been the first step towards the organisation of other
aspects of township life outside the framework of state authority. Given the
administrative vacuum described in paragraph 3.7 this was not an altogether unlikely
possibility. It seems that the EPTC had recieved some encouragement from Indian
businessmen that finance for such a venture would be made available - perhaps the
presence of Indians in the EPTC was helpful with regard to this (123). .There was
considerable tension between African and Indian traders in the freehold townships:
the two rival plans for establishing a bus service may have been an instance of this.
3.17
The final feature of the boycott which needs discussion is the nature of the
settlement, the totality (in contrast to Alexandra) of the boycotters1 victory.
The extroadinary thing was that the EPTC was asking for considerably greater
concessions: it was actually demanding a degree of control over the operation of
the bus service. The company offered several compromise solutions which included
reversion to old fares; despite the substiantial economic sacrifice involved in
boycotting the service, the EPTC, under popular pressure, was to hold out until
the company offered the terms outlined earlier (see paragraph 3.5). The following




The boycotters were able to hold out for a very long period: the existence of
alternative transport facilities was crucial. The bus company was a small one
and had few other routes. Unlike PUTCO, the EPC was totally independent - there
were no constraints on the sort of agreement it might reach with the boycotters.
3.17.2
The bus company came to be identified with gangsters who were willing (and
encouraged) to use violence against the boycotters. Fealings were bitter against
the bus company: so much so that a mere reversion to the pre-boycott status quo
was not acceptable. It is clear from the EPTC minutes that here the leadership was
falling in with the mood of the crowd rather than attempting to spur it to greater
intransigence.
3.17.3
There was complete unity among the leadership. This is one of the most
important contrasts with Alexandra. Several factors explain phis unity. First,
there was comparatively little external interest in the boycott: no white liberal
organisations tried to play a mediating role (in fact at one point the Institute of
Race Relations was approached). The boycott occurred in a township located at some
distance from a major urban centre, was visually undramatic (at first) and did
not involve the vast numbers of Alexandra. It did not affect employers and was
not so obviously visible to humanitarians. So we do not find that the local ANC
was being put under any pressure from the National Executive (with whom, in any
case , there was considerable tension). Secondly, there was no standholder element
within the EPTC committee - therefore there were no major clashes of economic
interest (which might otherwise have occurred after the fighting in June 1956).
Thirdly, there seems to have been no political rivalries either (which was
interesting , considering that one of the main complaints of Orlando Africanists was
the closeness of the ANC's relationship with the South African Indian Congress).
3.17.4
Like the Russians the EPTC was capable of exercising fierce sanctions against those
that challenged its policies: EPC staff were murdered; civic guard units were
mobilised; people who spoke against the boycott were attacked; picketing was
energetic and effective - it was made impossible to run a normal bus service. Though
ostensibly peaceful in intention (and there were occasions when EPTC leaders actually
protected EPC executives and police from angry picketers) , from the beginning
opposition was expressed in a violent idiom. Buses were burnt and constantly
stoned. Here the especially apalling service the EPC provided and the atrocious
incident of the train/bus crash were obviously important in stimulating'initial
antagonism.
3.17.5
Then there was the attitude of the government. In contrast to its reaction in
Alexandra, In Evaton the state does not appear to have interpreted events as being a
challenge to its authority. As we have seen this was rather sketchily represented
at Evaton but nevertheless it could have made the boycott far more difficult: inter-
-fering with the train timetable would have been an obvious strategy (124) as well as
subjecting Evaton train commuters to police checks. That the boycott was largely
by the national ANC and that politically it was low-key (the economic self-help
aspect was seldom expressed in nationalist terms) - these were obviously
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significant in determining the government's response. The internecine nature
of the violence might have also contributed to unwillingness to energetically
interfere: the violence did not represent a threat to the authorities, it was not
primarily directed against them, and indeed appeared to reinforce the tenets of
state ideology. Evaton boycott leaders were actually to request the
endorsement-out of the Russians - ironically a request which was refused(125).
3.17.6
Finally the possibility that the community may have been able to raise the
resources to finance their own bus company might have had some bearing on the
EPC's willingness to capitulate. , . .
3.18
Yet the victory of the Evaton boycotters was a phyrric affair. The . events of
June 1956 (which recieved some attention in the foreign press (126) ) highlighted
and drew attention to the lack of administrative machinary in the township.
Evaton was proclaimed an African township under the full gamut.of municipal
regulations. A governing council was constituted with nine elected advisory
members and nine nominees under the chairmanship of the Native Commissioner.
Influx control was introduced (127). The response of both the Russians and the
EPTC was indicative of the political limitations of the movement: there was no
protest against the new controls; instead they showed their willingness to
cooperate by putting themsi eves up for election with other community leaders (128)
The first to suffer under the new dispensation were some of the EPTC leaders
and Ralekeke Rantube; they were endorsed out. The Evaton boycotters had failed
to transcend the original limited objective of their action: their immediate
enemy, the bus company, had been defeated, but authority and the system it rested
upon had not been questioned.
4.1
Now we can provide some answers to the questions raised in section 1 of this
paper.
4.2
First , the role of political organisations in these movements. There seems to be
a good case for contending on the basis of their activity in Alexandra and their
comparative inactivity in Evaton that they can perform a useful function. In f.he
case of Alexandra, the ANC, with its vastly superior system of intelligence
compared to the more localised groupings was able to make strategic and tactical
decisions that ensured a victory over the fare issue. By coordinating struggles
elsewhere with those of Alexandra and Pretoria the ANC was to add substantially
to the boycott's impact. Moreover the boycotters were gradually being persuaded




But the ANC could also be accused of moving from a specific to a generalised
struggle too quickly, without any consideration of how the political energies
released by the boycott could be most effectively used. The; logic of the
boycott process seemed to lead to the 'stay-at-home1:
When we are tired we shall rest ...They are punishing us
because we are poor ...save food and prepare for the
offensive. (129)
But a poor community cannot sustain a stay-at-home long enough to make a serious
impact on the economy and even if it has accumulated the resources for a prolonged
withdrawal of labour the police will show far less hesitation in entering a
township and driving people back to work than they would in interfering with
a struggle situated within the workplace itself. A stay-at-home can be an
effective demonstration, only in very exceptional circumstances can it be anything
more.
4.3
Evaton represents a sin of om ission for the ANC - for though the neglect of the
boycotters by the nationalist organisation gave them a free hand in their
negotiations with the bus company, nevertheless it is possible that the
bitterness of the internecine conflict was at least in part a function of the
absence of a percieved powerful external, enemy* - No attempt was made to channel
resistance towards political ends: the struggle was reformist in the true sense
of the word - to use Legassick's phrase - its internal logic did not lead to
a questioning of the system as a whole. Perhaps communal divisions were too
profound for this to have happened: Evaton's obvious attraction as a catchment
area for the Basotho lumpenproletariat made overall solidarity very difficult.
There were opportunities which were lost: not least among them were the
numerous trials of picketers and EPTC members culminating in a murder trial
in December in which the EPTC was charged; no support came from the national
movement. The role a political organisation could have played at Evaton
could have been valuable though problematic; the 'sympathetic interpretation1
(see paragraph 1.4) of the violence of the boycott.
4.4.
Is there a distinct pattern to boycott behaviour which could lead to the
'institutionalizing' of popular power. This paper argues:• that the boycott form
of.protest had potential that could have been developed. First, widespread
participation was easier to achieve becuase it involved (in the case of a walking
boycott) no immediate sacrifice in economic terms. It was not illegal - indeed
it was one of the few forms of protest left to Africans that did not involve
breaking the law. It must be conceded that certain conditions favoured the
development of a boycott; these were present in the freehold townships with
their relative degree of freedom, the comparative ease of political and social
organisation, their strong sense of communal identity.
4.5
Then, the boycott process is itself immediatly suggestive: large scale meetings
and instant democracy - the dialectical relationship between leaders and crowd.
In the case of Alexandra the processions of walkers, the very tangible feeling
of being involved in protest (the pickets and fighting possibly served the same
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purpose at Evaton): unlike other boycotts (electoral, rent, education) this
demanded a degree of activism- The possibility of martyrs, court .cases, mass
oratory, the slogans, the songs - - each boycott had a symbolism and imagery of its
own but drew on a developed tradition: the Evaton boycotters reminded their
followers of the people's struggle in Alexandra in 1944, the Alexandra boycotters
were spurred by the Evaton victory of the previous year (and Molefi and Make
used to visit the APTC to advise them on the organisation d£ . the boycott (130) ).
Furthermore bus boycotts are often successful: the crowdrs immediate
protagonist is at their mercy for without their patronage it cannot function;
Initially the agencies of the state can do little more than play a secondary
har. assing role - enough to focus people's attention towards authority - not
enough to cow them into submission. The mode of protest and its immediate
objectives make it difficult to systematically crush by arresting a few ringleaders
The boycott does not depend on formal structure or key personalities; it acquires
its own momentum and only dies from exhaustion - it is at this J>oint that an
organisation's intelligence system is most crucial if it is going COL' tap the r:.<>
power of the boycott. Yes, to the extent to which the boycott can condition, can
accustom the people to direct communal action, to the extent it can unite, and
the extent to which it can exploit lines of weakness in the power^bloc to gain
immediate victories (as well as creating a popular awareness of the ultimate
/-" solidarity of the power bloc), then popular power is one the way to being
institutionalised. And these processes were apparent at least in Alexandra in
1957.
4.6
And so* finally,it is possible that the boycotts help to show us where the
ANC went wrong in the 1950s. For Christians in the movement the road to
freedom was via the cross: salvation through martyrdom:
...we appeal to you to become the apostles to do this
noble and holy job of delivering the people of Africa into
the kingdom of heaven on earth... (Meer 197 1 : )
For social revolutionaries within the Congress Alliance nothing.succeeded like
failure: the oppressive character of the state had to be revealed in all its







I would like to mention the help I recieved from Mr Modike Dikobi: a conversation
about his life in Alexandra provided me with many useful insights and suggestions
This paper, though, is principally based on library research and I* am extremely
grateful to the staff of the Witwatersrand, Univensity of South Africa,
South African Association of Newspapers and Johannesburg Public Libraries for
their help and kindness. In particular I should mention Miss Marcelle Jacobson
in the Historical Papers Section of the Witwatersrand University Library for
drawing my attention to material I might otherwise have missed. Finally it
should be said that many of the ideas in this paper were developed during the
course of many conversations about Bus Boycotts with Professor Air Stadler of
the Department of Politics at Wiwatersrand. His interest and encouragement have
been very valuable.
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Footnotes
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